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1. Introduction 
 
Russia has experienced vastly different economic and political systems over the last 
century. Following a period with substantial reforms undertaken by the communist regime 
shortly before it gave up power in the early 1990s, the country has seen a gradual 
transformation from a planned economy to a democratic market economy. This has been 
accompanied by severe cuts in public spending and economic uncertainty and income 
drops for large groups of the population (while others have managed to accumulate an 
enormous wealth).  
 During the last two decades, fertility has also fallen dramatically. While the  total 
fertility rate (see definition below) was 2.1 in 1985, it had fallen to 1.34 in 1995 and 1.17 in 
2004 (Goskomstat Rossii, State Committee on Statistics of Russian Federation, 2008). 
Regardless of mortality, a persistent fertility below 2 will inevitably lead to a decline in the 
population size in the long run in the absence of net in-migration. Indeed, since Russia also 
has high mortality and little net immigration, a strong decline is projected. According to 
UN forecasts, the population of Russia may be only 112 millions in 2050 - 31 millions 
below its present size (from the speech of Vladimir Putin “On Rasing Russia‟s Birth Rate” 
Population and Development Review, June 2006).  
 In principle, fertility may be reduced because of increasing childbearing costs. In 
demography, these costs are typically considered as having two components: „direct costs‟, 
which are the expenses for food, clothes etc., and „indirect costs‟ or „opportunity costs‟, 
which are the parents‟ (usually the mother‟s) loss of income as a result of having a child to 
care for. If it is relatively easy for mothers to work because of inexpensive high-quality 
child care, and there is a generous maternity leave system and large child allowances, 
childbearing costs will be lower. Such kind of support to families with children were quite 
well developed in the Soviet Union, and some worsening occurred during the early post-
communist period (see elaboration below), but there was not a major set-back, so it is not 
obvious that increasing childbearing costs are an important driving force behind the lower 
fertility. 
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 Low incomes for men, who typically do not stay home to look after a child, is another 
possible reason for the currently low fertility, though the basis for such a hypothesis is also 
rather weak. Given childbearing costs, it is reasonable to expect that a low purchasing 
power will reduce fertility. However, when incomes are low, it is likely that direct 
childbearing costs are low as well, because people may feel that they do not need to spend 
so much on each child. Thus, one cannot readily conclude that low income leads to low 
fertility (e.g. Becker 1991). An effect in this direction has been seen in some studies, 
including one from Russia (Kharkova and Andreev 2000), but not in others. A low fertility 
is perhaps particularly likely when there is a quite rapid decline in income, because the 
expectations about what to spend on each child to a large extent may be influenced by 
earlier earnings. In support of that, fertility-depressing effects of male unemployment have 
been seen even in countries with generous social support systems (Kravdal 2001a).  
 Another possible reason for the reduced fertility is that the liberalization opened up 
alternatives to spending time and money on children. For example, new consumer goods 
became available and it was easier to travel abroad. In addition, there has been a further 
drift away from marriage, driven to some extent by value changes (see below). 
 In recent years, Russian authorities have become worried about the low fertility, but 
just as there is uncertainty about the reasons for its decline, it is hard to know what one 
should do to bring it up again. One might for example just wait for a general economic 
improvement, hoping that it would lead to higher fertility, or one might increase incomes 
for families (without increasing opportunity costs, which would be the situation if women‟s 
earnings were increased without good child care solutions), by taking from other segments 
of the population. A less uncertain approach would be to subsidize childbearing costs, and 
this is precisely what the Putin administration started doing in 2006, by establishing a so-
called family or maternal capital of 250000 rubles and upgrading child care benefits (see 
details below). In principle, one might also increase fertility by stimulating people‟s 
childbearing preferences or by changing social norms, but that is difficult and has not been 
tried. For obvious reasons, it has not been suggested to make contraception and abortion 
less accessible either. 
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 To summarize, the idea behind the current population policy is that there are large 
opportunity and direct costs of childbearing that can be reduced through political 
interventions, while there is more doubt that generally higher wages among people in 
reproductive ages would increase fertility. The intention of the present analysis is to assess 
the plausibility of these assumptions by checking how several different economic variables 
that indicate incomes and opportunity costs affect childbearing desires. 
 More precisely, I estimate regression models for the probability of wanting another 
child among women who already have at least one child, using survey data. Most of the 
analysis is further restricted to the married or cohabiting. The models include family 
income in the survey month (the sum of the two partners‟ incomes) and two indicators of 
the income level over a longer period. In addition, they include the woman‟s education, 
which is an important determinant of her wages and thus the opportunity costs of 
childbearing, and whether she was employed at the time of interview. Further motivation 
for this choice of variables is given below.  
 The text is organized as follows: First, I present a theoretical framework. After that, I 
describe the Russian setting, with emphasis on the economic situation and the family and 
population policies. Then, I present the data, the statistical approach and the variables 
included in the models, and finally, I present the results and draw conclusions.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
The Eastrelin-Easterlin (1987) framework is often used in fertility analysis. According to 
that framework – or rather a version of it that considers a woman‟s chance of having 
another child - a woman‟s fertility is determined by three main factors. The first is the 
„supply‟ of children or „natural fertility‟, which is her chance of having a child if nothing is 
done actively to reduce fertility. It is determined by whether she lives in a sexual 
relationship, the amount of sexual activity, and her ability to conceive (and her partner‟s 
ability to contribute to that) and bring a pregnancy to term. The latter is in turn partly 
dependent on whether the woman breastfeeds an older child. Whether she breastfeeds (for a 
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certain number of months after birth) may to some extent be determined by social norms. 
In some societies, but not in Russia, there are also norms against sexual activity during a 
certain period of time after birth, or after having become a grandmother. If people abide by 
these norms, we would still say that they have „natural fertility‟, that their fertility is equal 
to the „supply‟, or that their fertility is not under individual control (though it may still be 
under „social control‟).  
The second main factor in the Easterlin-Crimmins framework is the „demand‟ side 
or the „childbearing desires‟, i.e. whether the woman (after discussion with her partner) 
would like to have another child. The expected mortality may be taken into account in such 
considerations. If one realizes that there is a large chance that a child will die, one may 
want to have, say 5, to be quite sure that 3 survives. This issue is of little relevance in 
Russia, where child mortality after all is quite low.  
The number of children one would like to see surviving depends partly on the 
couple‟s purchasing power and the expected costs of childbearing. There are two main 
components of the latter: „direct costs‟ (e.g. clothes and food) and „opportunity costs‟ (loss 
of labour income for the partner who stays at home with the child, and who is largely the 
mother). Besides, given childbearing costs and purchasing power, there may be differences 
in the perceived emotional rewards from having and rearing children compared to the 
satisfaction one might get from an alternative use of time and money: Some people take 
great pleasure in being with children and seeing them grow up; others would prefer, say, 
activities with friends, expensive hobbies or luxury goods. These „preferences‟ for 
childbearing also affect the childbearing desires. Finally, there are likely to be norms about 
the number of children one should have, most notably a strong pressure to have at least one 
and preferable two children (but perhaps only if married), and perhaps also norms about 
appropriate timing. One may consider these explicit fertility norms a fourth determinant of 
the childbearing desires. In addition, there may norms about for example mothers‟ work, 
which have implications for childbearing costs.  
The third main determinant of the chance of having a child is the access to and 
accept of abortion and various types of efficient contraception. 
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In Russia and other developed countries, the „demand‟ side is particularly important 
for completed fertility, which is also the reason why I focus on that component. Most 
people are sufficiently fecund and in a sexual relationship for a sufficiently long period to 
be able to have many more children than they would like to have, but they do regulate their 
fertility, so they end up having the number of children they want („fertility desires‟) plus a 
few due to inadequate contraception that is not fully compensated for by abortion (abortion 
is very common in Russia; see below).  
Let me elaborate a little on the economic determinants of the fertility desires if the 
woman is married or cohabiting. Consider first the situation where she does not work and 
does not intend to work, regardless of future childbearing. If her partner has a high income, 
one might assume that she (they) were more likely to want another child than if he had a 
low income. However, as mentioned earlier, people who are rich will also feel that they 
should spend more than others on each child. They may perhaps also attach more value to 
the material luxuries that compete with childbearing. Thus, those with a stable high income 
do not necessarily have more children than those with stable low incomes (e.g. Becker 
1991)  However, it is possible that a sharp decline in income, for example as a result of 
unemployment, depresses fertility, because the aspirations may need time to change. They 
may reflect the higher incomes in past years (or perhaps the economic situation of other 
people, which may not have deteriorated). 
If paid work is an alternative for the woman, the argument becomes more complex.  
If she has to stay home, say, 5 years to care for a child, but otherwise would have worked, 
having a child means that she would lose about 5*1800 times her hourly wage. This is the 
„opportunity costs‟ of childbearing (Sinyavskaya 2007).  Obviously, a woman with high 
wage potential has most to lose. She would also contribute more to the family income 
during the period she does work, but the effect of that – the so-called „income effect‟ -  is 
not necessarily positive, as just pointed out, and even if it were, it may be outweighed by 
the negative contribution from the higher opportunity costs. It is widely believed that 
women with a high wage potential have low fertility, all else similar.  
Unfortunately, data on wage potentials are scarce. However, the educational level of 
a woman is often available in data used for fertility analysis, and it is documented that 
  
Another child in Russia 
6 
education reduces fertility (e.g. Cleland and von Ginneken 1988). One main argument is 
the higher opportunity costs among the better educated, but there are also other possible 
explanations, such as more efficient contraceptive use.  
So far, it has been assumed that the woman is married or cohabiting. If she is not, 
her fertility desires are likely to be weaker, for obvious reasons (and if she is not even 
sexually active, the „supply‟ will be zero as well). There may also be differences between 
cohabitants and married, because of norms against out-of-wedlock childbearing or the 
degree to which the woman expects that there is a partner to rely on in the future for 
economic and other support, but I will not take this into account in this analysis. Anyway, 
note that there also is a possibility of an opposite causation: People may, for example, 
marry or remain married because they already have had or expect a child.  
 
 
3. The Russian setting 
 
3.1. Fertility trends  
 
The development of the period total fertility rate (the average number of children that 
women would have during their lives if they, at every age, experience the birth rate 
observed for women at that age in the year in focus) is shown in Figure 1. After a decline in 
the 1950s and 1960s, a quite stable level in the 1970s and 1980s and further reduction after 
the political restructuring, the level has been quite stable at 1.1-1.4 since the mid-1990s. 
This currently low level reflects both that women end up with quite few children and that 
the age at birth is increasing. (If the number of children that women have is constant, but 
the age at birth increases over some years and then stabilizes, the period total fertility rate 
will first decline and afterwards return to its earlier level.) For example, the average age at 
first delivery was 29 in 1999 compared to 25 in 1989 according to Spielauer, Koytcheva 
and Kostova (2007).  These authors also reported that in 1989, 6% of women aged 40 were 
childless and  28% had only one child, while the corresponding numbers in   1999 were 
14% and 53%.  
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Figure 1. Total fertility rate in Russia 1950 - 2006 
 
Fertility Rates in Russia 1950 -2006
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3.2. Family and marriage 
 
As other developed countries, Russia has experienced marked changes in marriage 
and divorce over the last decades. For example, the proportion of women aged 20-40 who 
are married was reduced by 7% (from 60% to 53%) from 1989 to 2002 (State Statistics 
Organization, 2002). The proportion never-married increased from 13% to 18%, and the 
proportion divorced from 8% to 11%. This movement away from marriage is to a large 
extent compensated for by informal cohabitation (among those in a relationship, 77% were 
married and 23% cohabitant in 2004). It is widely believed that these changes are partly a 
result of ideas about individual freedom (from religious doctrines about living 
arrangements) and women‟s growing independence.  
There has also been an increase in out-of-wedlock fertility. 10,6 % of unmarried 
one-child mothers in 1980 increased till 14,6% in 1990 and till 21,1 % in 1995. In the 
material of the year 2003 that I analyze, 27% of the one-child mothers are not married. 
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3.3. Abortion and contraception 
 
Because of poor access to contraceptives, abortion rates have been much higher in Russia 
than in the West, though some improvement has been made in recent years. In 1987, the 
average Russian woman had 3,5-4 abortions during her reproductive life, and in 1960 the 
figures were even higher, though there is much uncertainty about this since the information 
about abortions (and infant mortality) was confidential at that time. Since 1988, there has 
been much concern about the high abortion rates (partly because of the consequences for 
subsequent fecundity and reproductive health; e.g. Avdeev and Monnier 1996), and family 
programs that propagandized healthy contraception were initiated. According to various 
estimates, the average Russian woman now has 2-2,5 abortions during her reproductive 
life. It is especially important that the number of abortions has been reduced among the 
young.  
 
3.4   Women’s employment 
 
The chauvinistic family model, where one partner provides for the family, was quite 
popular in Russia for many decades. It was caused mainly by lower level of earnings 
among women compared to men, which was in its turn caused by discrimination on the 
basis of sex in when applicants were selected for job and in job promotion, as well as 
structural unemployment, since women‟s skills often did not match the requirements of the 
offered job (Bridger and Kay,1996; Lubyova and Sabirianova, 2001). However, during the 
Soviet time, the majority of the women were employed. Both better- and less-educated 
women were supposed to work, and the Soviet government provided them with jobs.  
In 1992, shortly after the political restructuring, 52% of the women were employed. 
The corresponding proportion later in that decade was 54% (Kapelushnikov, 2008). 
According to an investigation by Evans and Kelley (2001), which covered the late 1990s, 
15% of mothers with pre-school children were primarily home-makers, 10% worked part 
time and 75% worked full time. In my material, which is from the year 2003, 68% of the 
women with at least 1 child were employed and 8% were on paid or unpaid leave. The 
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remaining 24% were non-employed or unemployed. As in other countries, men‟s 
employment rates are higher than women‟s. Men also earn 15-20% more than women even 
within a given position (Kolisnichenko, 2008).  
 
3.5. Consumption, incomes and poverty  
 
The cumulative incomes of the population in Russia in 2005 were about 12.5 trillion rubles 
or 440 billion US dollars. This is equal to three thousand dollars per year or 250 dollars 
(7500 rubles) per month per person of the population. As shown in Figure 2, almost half of 
the income is spent on consumer goods such as footwear, clothes, medicines, and housing, 
29% is spent on food, and another 29% on „services‟, such as municipal housing transport, 
traveling, hairdressing salons, and entertainment.  
 
Figure 2. Structure of consumer charges in Russia in 2005 (State Committee on Statistic 
of Russian Federation) 
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For families with children, the distribution of the expenses differs from the national 
average, of course. During the first year of its life, when the parents also receive support 
from the state, the child eats either breast milk or a dairy mix that is rather inexpensive. 
However, some money also needs to be spent on clothes, diapers, footwear, toys etc. At the 
time when parents may consider having a second child, the costs of the first one may be 
quite high compared to the total family income.  
 
According to State Committee (2005), 9% of the Russian population in 2005 had an 
income below 1500 rubles per person, and 25% had incomes between 1500 and 2000. The 
poverty level was set at 2200 rubles, which is above the official „living wage‟ but below the 
one I have calculated (see below) according to the average prices for the food. Note, by the 
way, that the widely used poverty line of 1 USD per day used in many global discussion of 
poverty corresponds to about 2000 rubles monthly.  
 
People below the poverty line include in particular pensioners, members of large or 
incomplete families, invalids, and people with serious alcohol or drug problems. Besides, 
doctors, teachers, the state and municipal employees working in light industry and the other 
workers may receive wages of 3000-5000 rubles per month at the eight-hour working day 
which is less than average wage level. When calculating the „living wage‟ (the minimum 
amount needed for survival), the government has taken into account expenses for essential 
food, consumption goods and services (Federal law 2005).  This „living wage‟ forms a base 
for a social policy to support the poorest groups of the population. In theory, the „minimal 
wage‟ and the „minimal old age pension‟ should be above the „living wage‟. The „living 
wage‟ is currently 1804 rubles, of which the „food basket‟ is 1709 rubles (Table 1). The 
minimal living wage for the family of two members is supposed to be 3920 rubles or 1960 
rubles per person per month.  
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Table 1.  Living wage, food basket and other charges in Russia (2005) 
 
 Rubles USD equivalent 
Living wage 1804 69 
The “food basket”: 1709 65 
              Food 873 33 
              Consumer 
goods 
412 16 
              Services 424 16 
Charges on obligatory 
payments and 
gathering 
95 4 
 
 
Table 2 shows the Russian „food basket‟ of the year 2005. Using the following 
prices for its the various components:  
Bread, flour, macaroni, grouts – 16 rubles for 0,5 kg 
Meet – 250 rubles for 1 kg 
Fish – 200 rubles for 1 kg 
Potato – 50 rubles for 1 kg 
Vegetables – 30 rubles for 1 kg 
 
I calculated its total price as 2200, not 873 rubles as budgeted by the government.  
If we add the 836 rubles for consumer goods and services, we get 3036 rubles against 
budgeted 1709 rubles. This huge gap demonstrates that 36% of Russian population with 
earnings under 2000 rubles level can not afford the minimum consumption budgeted for 1 
person.  
 
 
 
  
Another child in Russia 
12 
Table 2.  Food basket of 2005 in Russia  
 
 Gram 
Bread, flour, 
macaroni, groats 
366 
Meet 102 
Fish 44 
Potato 295 
Vegetables 266 
 
3.6 Family policies 
 
In contrast to the political efforts made to reduce fertility in some countries, such as China, 
Russia now has a policy that is explicitly pro-natalist. In the Soviet period, the family 
policy probably contributed positively to fertility although the primary intention was to 
release women‟s work potential, for the benefit of the national economy. 
 
Childbearing has long been subsidized by the government. The level of the 
subsidies has varied considerably over time, however. Absolute amounts as well as 
amounts relative to the salary (which is a highly relevant measure because of devaluations 
of the rubles and inflation) are shown in Table 3 for the three years 1981, 1995 and 2006.  
In 1981 and 1996, all mothers who had been previously employed were paid the same 
absolute amount regardless of their salary. In 2006, however, the monthly subsidy – paid 
out during the first year of the child‟s life - was 40% of the official salary, but not more 
than 16125 rubles. Hence, woman with a salary above 41 000 rubles per month have a cost 
of childbearing that those who earn less do not have. There was also a lower limit of 1500 
rubles.  
 
If we compare the 1981 amount, which was 35 rubles (20% of the average salary in 
1981) and the 2006 amount, which was 2800 rubles (40% of the average salary in 2006) in 
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natural food units, we come to the following: for this money in 1981 people could buy 4-5 
kg of sausages or 25-30 l of milk, or 50-60 kg of bread (Rybakovskiy, 2001), while in 2006 
for 2800 rubles (40% of the average salary) people could buy 7 kg of sausages, 93 l of milk 
and 90 kg of bread. These simple calculations show that in 2006 employed women with 
average and higher income have got better government support in a qualitative sense.  
Subsidies for the non-employed women depend on the number of children. 
Currently, those with 2 children are in an even better situation than employed women who 
earn less than 11000 rubles, because unemployed women get 4500 for 2 children – each 
month during one year -  while the latter would get  40% of an amount less than 11000, 
which is less than 4500 rubles. The highest possible amount of child allowance for the non-
employed in 2006 was 6000 rubles (which is 80% of the average salary). It means that no 
matter if there are 3 or 4 children in the family; the maternity allowance will not exceed 
6000 rubles.   
 
In addition to this monthly support to employed and non-employed women, a lump 
sum is paid at the time of birth. Presently, the sum for one child is 7000 rubles, regardless 
of whether it is the first, second or higher-order child. There is also a cash grant of 500 
rubles from the government that is paid out every month until the child turns 16 years old.  
 
To summarize, for a non-employed woman who has given birth to a second child, 
the support for this child is 7000 rubles (lump-sum) plus 3000 rubles pr month  (welfare 
payment) plus 500 rubles pr month (additional cash-grant). In addition she gets 500 rubles 
pr month (additional cash grant) for the first child (assuming that it is older than 12 
months). This amounts to a total of 4000 rubles per month plus the lump-sum. In 
comparison, an employed woman with average salary will get a lump-sum of 7000 rubles, 
40% of the average salary, which is about 2800 rubles, and 500 rubles of additional cash 
grant per child. This adds up to 3800 rubles per month plus the lump-sum. An employed 
woman with the salary over 41000 rubles will get a lump-sum of 7000 rubles, in addition to 
40% of her salary (not more that 16125 rubles) and 500 rubles of additional cash grant per 
child, which is 17125 rubles.  
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As pointed out above, one implication of the current system is that employed 
mothers with incomes below average (45% of the employed according to Gimpelson 2007), 
get less support than the non-employed mothers. Women with low incomes are also in a 
disadvantaged position compared to the situation for this group in earlier years, when 
everyone got the same amount, which of course was relatively higher the lower the income.  
Today, lone mother (almost 27% of the sample in my research) will get only 800 
rubles beyond to the common subsidies per month.  
 
Finally, a special support of 250000 rubles to those who have had a second or higher-order 
child (so-called „maternal capital‟) was introduced in 2006. This amount is earmarked for: 
 
- purchasing of property (from three years after the birth of the child) 
 
- the higher education of the child 
 
- the provision of mothers pension 
 
One should note, however, that the average price for 1 square meter in Moscow currently is 
4000 USD (100000 rubles). Thus, the amount is only enough to increase the size of the 
housing by 25 square meters. In contrast to this, the amount corresponds to the price of 
about 1000 square meters in small towns and villages. One may therefore say that this 
policy in particular encourages childbearing in poor regions. Further, it may seem 
unnecessary to have 250000 rubles available for higher education, which is mostly free in 
Russia. Saving money for such purposes, or for even later use as old age pension, is also 
risky because of the possibility of high inflation.  
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Table 3. The basic kinds of grants to families with children in Soviet Union and Russian 
Federation (from Rybakovskiy L., 2006 and State Statistics Organization of Russian 
Federation)  
 
Type of the grant 
of payment 
1981 1995 2006 
1. Maternity and birth benefit  
Lump-sum at a birth 
of the child 
1chd – 50 
rubles(30% of 
the average 
salary) 
2chd – 100 
rubles 
102500 rubles 
(app.112% of 
the average 
salary) 
7000 rubles (app. 100% of the average 
salary) 
Subsidies for   
women for the first 
year of maternity-
leave 
35 rubles (that 
is 20% of the 
average salary) 
35000 rubles 
(that is 38% of 
the average 
salary) 
40% of salary, not more than 16 125 
rubles (applies only to employed 
women)  
Monthly cash-grant 
for the child to non-
employed women  
12 rubles (that 
is 6,7% of the 
average salary) 
25000 rubles 
(that is 27% of 
the average 
salary) 
1500 rubles (that is 21% of the average 
salary) for the 1
st
 child, 3000 rubles  
for the second and more 
500 rubles (that is 7% of the  
average salary) 
Not more than 6000 rubles 
Monthly cash-grant 
for the child to 
employed women 
12 rubles 
(6,7% of the 
average salary) 
25000 rubles 
(that is 27% of 
the average 
salary) 
500 rubles (that is 7% of the average 
salary) 
Taxes for 
issuelessness 
6% of the 
salary  
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4. Data and methods 
 
4.1. Data 
 
The data were taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Surveys (RLMS), which can 
be downloaded from the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina. 
The RLMS is a nationally representative household and individual survey designed 
primarily to measure the effects of Russian reforms on the health and economic well-being 
of the population. However, it also includes some information on demographic behavior 
because of its relevance for people‟s health and the current and future economy. The survey 
has been held every year between 1992 and 2005, but in this analysis only the data from 
2003 were used.  
The 2003 round of the survey included 12856 individuals. 1466 of these were 
women of age 15-55 with at least 1 child, and these were included in the analysis. The 
focus was on how some economic and other factors measured at interview (see details 
below) are linked to the desire for having an additional child. An alternative might have 
been to analyse actual fertility in past years, but this would be problematic because the 
situation at interview could be a consequence of fertility rather than a determinant.  
 
4.2. Statistical model  
 
I estimated logistic regression models to see how various factors affect the 
probability of wanting another child. Binary responses, such as want vs. do not want at 
least one more child, arise in many fields of study. Logistic regression analysis is often 
used to investigate the relationship between these discrete responses and a set of 
explanatory variables.  
Mathematically, the model is:  
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where pi is the probability that woman i wants another child, x1,i-xk,i are k independent 
variables and the βs represent the effects of these variables.  
If the estimated beta is negative for, say, high-school graduates compared to those 
with lower education(a reference category), it means that women with a high school 
diploma less often want another child than those with lower education. As an example, 
consider an estimated beta of – 0.35. This means that ln (p/1-p) is reduced by -0.35, which 
means that p/(1-p) is reduced by 29.5% (1-exp(-0.35)=0.295 ). At very small levels of p, 
also p will be reduced by approximately 29.5%; at higher levels, it is not quite as simple. 
(Put differently, the exact reduction depends on p, which has the implication that it is also 
determined by the level of the other variables.)  
These logit regression models are estimated in the SAS software, using the 
maximum likelihood method. 
 
4.3 Variables 
 
The woman‟s educational level is included as a two-level variable. I only make a 
distinction between those who have a high school diploma (more than 14 years of 
schooling) and those without. Education is linked to a number of factors that may affect 
childbearing desires. In particular, women with high education tend to have high wages. 
That means that they lose more income than the less educated per time-unit out of the 
labour market to care for a child. On the other hand, they may want to return earlier 
because of this, and some of them may have a flexible job that also makes an early return 
easier. It is possible that education affects fertility desires also through the preferences, or 
that the better educated feel more free not to abide by any norms about having at least two 
children. There is little knowledge about the former, but some support for the latter 
(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). The better-educated women are less likely to be married 
than the less educated (a situation that may be about to change, according to Oppenheimer 
1994), but those who are married, tend to have better-educated husbands, though the 
implication of that for fertility desires is unclear. Unfortunately, the inclusion of education 
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in models for second or higher-order births involves certain selection problems. I return to 
that below.  
 Another variable included in the model is the total monthly income of the family at 
the time of interview. It is divided into 3 groups. The first group consists of those families 
whose monthly income is less than 5000 rubles. If there are two adults in the family in 
addition to at least one child, this means that the family is below or close to the poverty 
level (see definition above), though the situation is better during the first year because of 
the welfare benefit (typically about 3000 rubles per month). The second group consists of 
those with an income of 5000-10000 rubles, and the third consists of those with an income 
of more than 10000 rubles. There is a special category for those who did not report the 
family income, Unfortunately, there is no information on how much each of the partners (if 
the woman is married or cohabitant) contributes to this income. Therefore, a additional set 
of models is estimated separately for employed and non-employed women.  
 It is possible that the family income reported in the survey does not include activity 
from the „black labor market‟, which is large in Russia. In addition, incomes may change 
substantially from year to year, so that the level shortly before interview is not very 
representative of earlier incomes or what the family expects to earn in the coming years. I 
therefore consider also three indicators of long-term incomes in the analysis: whether the 
family owns another separate apartment, whether they own a car, and whether they own a 
dacha (vacation house).  Certainly, such ownership does not only reflect the person‟s or 
couple‟s own earnings, but also the resources in the larger family. However, one may 
perhaps rely on these resources also to cover child expenses, or the property may be sold or 
rented out. As should be obvious from the earlier discussion, the importance of such 
sources of income or support for the childbearing desires cannot be predicted, but there is 
at least no opportunity costs involved. To the extent that the ownership of these goods 
signals the couple‟s own labour incomes however, the opportunity cost argument is again 
relevant. For example, an apartment may have been bought because the woman has a high 
income (while the man perhaps has a rather low income), and this high income for the 
woman means that there are large opportunity costs of childbearing.  
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 I also consider the woman‟s employment status at interview, grouped into five 
categories: those who are employed, those who are on maternity-leave, those who are on 
another kind of paid leave (as disablement pensions, for example), those who are on unpaid 
leave, and those who are not employed. The latter include some who do not want to work 
and some who would like to work but cannot find work (i.e. unemployed). In the regression 
models, those on leave are pooled together because the groups are small.  
Unfortunately, it is not obvious what a measure of current employment captures, 
and therefore it is very difficult to interpret a statistical relationship between woman‟s 
employment and fertility (desires) (For an early discussion of this, see e.g. Lehrer and 
Nerlove 1986). To see the problem, consider one woman with a little child who works and 
one who doesn‟t. Perhaps the latter does not consider paid work an option, regardless of 
childbearing. In that case, there would be no opportunity costs involved in having another 
child, which suggest that she would be particularly likely to want another child (though this 
effect may be set off against the lower family income, to the extent that there is such an 
income effect). On the other hand, it is also possible that she does consider work an option, 
just as much as the other woman, but that she has not been able to find adequate child care. 
Assuming that they both take opportunity costs into account in their decision-making, the 
latter may expect the largest opportunity costs, because she at least after the previous birth 
has had most problems combining work and child care, which may be a good indication of 
what is likely to happen in case of later births as well. Thus, she would not be particularly 
likely to want another child, unless her loss of income after a subsequent birth is 
completely compensated by support from the state. This pattern was described in a recent 
analysis by Sinyavskaya, Ibragimova, Kartseva and Zakharov (2007). 
 One should also take the woman‟s age at interview (or at last previous birth) into 
account. In addition to being a determinant of the income, age has a strong effect on 
fertility. Obviously, there is a supply-side argument: After about age 35, there is a 
diminished ovarian reserve and an increase in chromosomal abnormalities in any fertilized 
embryos. Menopause occurs on average at about age 41 (Tarlatzis and Zepridis 2003). 
However, age may also affect the fertility desires, which is the component in focus of this 
analysis. In particular, those who are relatively old may feel they do not have the energy to 
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take care of another child or be afraid that the child may not be healthy. (Childless women 
who are rather young may consider themselves too immature, or they may be eager to 
continue education, gain more work experience or enjoy a leisure time without children 
before embarking on parenthood, but such arguments would be less relevant when they 
have already become mothers.) In this analysis, age is included as a grouped variable.  
 Also the number of children and age of the youngest child are potentially important 
control variables. For example, having many children or young children may be the reason 
why the woman doesn‟t work, and it may also affect the father‟s income. At the same time, 
it affects fertility desires for obvious reasons.  
 Finally, it is important to make a distinction between those who live in a partnership, 
whether a marriage or an informal union, and those who are single. Most of the analysis is 
restricted to those who have a partner.  
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Introductory description 
 
Table 4 shows the number of women in each of the categories of each of the independent 
variables, as well as the proportions of these women who want another child 
 
Table 4. Number of women and proportions in different categories and proportions 
wanting a second child. All women. 
  
Number of women and proportions  %wanting 
second child 
Age of woman    
 <20      15(1%)                       60%  
 20-24      178(12%)   61% 
  
25-29      321(22%)   53% 
30-34      370(25%)   32% 
35-39      328(22%)   12%  
Over40     254(17%)   5% 
Number of children 
 1 child     919(63%)           46%  
 2 children     454(31%)   8%  
3 or more children    93(6%)   5% 
Age of the youngest child 
 0-1       168(11%)           47%  
2-4      318(22%)   41%  
5-7      242(16%)   41% 
8-10      248(17%)   34% 
Over11     490(33%)   14% 
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Table 4. Continued 
Number of women and proportions %wanting 
second child 
Family Income  
  Less than 5000    427(29%)   26% 
  5000-10000     505(34%)   31%  
More than 10000    444(30%)   37% 
Missing value     90(6%)   36% 
High school diploma   
No            
Yes      1257(86%)   31% 
Employment      
Employed     996(68%)   29% 
On maternity leave    99(7%)   43% 
On another kind of paid leave  7(0,5%)   43% 
On unpaid leave    5(0,3%)   20% 
Non-employed    359(24%)   34% 
 
Car       
No 
Yes      552(37%)   33%  
Dacha     
No 
Yes      253(17%)   32% 
Another apartment   
No 
Yes      101(7%)   44% 
Married or cohabiting 
No 
Yes      1186(81%)   34% 
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As one would expect, the desire for an additional child is weakest among women who are not 
married or cohabiting, who are rather old, who already have more than one child, or whose 
youngest child is rather old. Further, there are some differences according to education, 
work, family income, and property ownership. In particular, it is worth noting that the 
proportion wanting another child is highest among those with the highest family income.   
In table 5, the corresponding numbers are shown for women with a partner (81% of 
the sample). They are very similar.  
 
Table 5. Number of women and proportions in different categories and proportions 
wanting a second child. Married and cohabiting women. 
 
 
Number of women and proportions %wanting second child 
Age of woman    
<20      15(1%)                       60%  
 20-24      148(12%)   66%  
25-29      265(22%)   57% 
30-34      298(25%)   33% 
35-39      256(21%)   13%  
Over40     204(17%)   5% 
Number of children 
 1 child     722(61%)           51%  
 2 children     381(32%)   8%  
3 or more children    83(7%)   6% 
Age of the youngest child 
0-1       154(13%)           48%  
2-4      265(22%)   43%  
5-7      207(17%)   43% 
8-10      189(16%)   36% 
Over11     371(31%)   15% 
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Table 5. Continued 
 
Number of women and proportions %wanting second child 
Family Income  
  Less than 5000    307(26%)   28% 
  5000-10000     406(34%)   32%  
More than 10000    391(33%)   39% 
 
Missing value     11(5%)   45% 
High school diploma     
No 
Yes      1019(86%)   33% 
Employment      
Employed     784(66%)   31% 
On maternity leave    94(8%)   45% 
On another kind of paid leave  7(0,6%)   43% 
On unpaid leave    5(0,4%)   20% 
Non-employed    296(25%)   39% 
Car       
No 
Yes      513(43%)   34% 
  
Dacha       
No 
Yes      214(18%)   33% 
Another apartment     
No 
Yes      81(7%)   46% 
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5.2. Regression models 
 
Estimates from a model for the entire sample are shown in table 6. As expected, the 
probability of wanting another child increases with the woman‟s age (up to 24) and then 
declines. It also decreases with the number of children, and it is particularly low for those 
who are neither married nor cohabiting. However, there is no clear effect of the age of the 
youngest child (as opposed to what was indicated  in tables 4 and 5, which show gross 
relationships without control for other variables).  
 Interestingly, a significantly positive income effect appears, while there is no effect of 
being non-employed as opposed to being  employed (there is a positive estimate for the 
small group of women on leave, but it is not significant) or of having high-school education 
rater than less education.  
 
Table 6. Effects on various socio-demographic variables on the log-odds of wanting 
another child. All women. 
Estimate (Standard error) 
Age of woman    
<20      -0,24(0,57)                     
 20-24      0     
25-29      -0,21(0,21)    
30-34      -0,84(0,24)***    
35-39      -1,85(0,30)***    
Over40     -3,15(0,37)***  
   
Number of children 
 1 child     0             
 2 children     -1,90(0,20)***    
3 or more children    -1,98(0,42)*** 
 
 
    
  
Another child in Russia 
26 
Table 6. Continued 
Estimate (Standard error) 
 
Age of the youngest child 
0-1       0,15(0,24)             
2-4      0      
5-7      0,30(0,21)    
8-10      0,43(0,23)*    
Over11     -0,19(0,26)    
Family Income  
  Less than 5000(reference group)  0    
  5000-10000     0,24(0,17)     
More than 10000    0,50(0,17)***  
Missing value     0,69(0,29)**   
High school diploma  
No      0 
Yes      0,15(0,19)    
Employment      
Employed     0    
“On leave”               0,37(0,28)    
Non-employed    0,05(0,18)    
Marital status  
Married or cohabiting   0,84(0,18)*** 
Neither married nor cohabiting  0 
 
***P<0,01,  **p<0,05,   *p<0,1  
 
 
The results are very similar when single women are left out (table 7). In these models, I 
also include ownership of car, dacha, and an additional apartment. These indicators of 
affluence are not significantly linked with the probability of wanting another child. 
Stimulating effects are only very weakly indicated.  
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Table 7. Effects on various socio-demographic variables on the log-odds of wanting 
another child. Married or cohabiting women. 
 
Estimate (Standard error) 
Age of woman    
 <20      -0,40(0,59)                        
 20-24 (regerence group)    0     
25-29      -0,29(0,24)    
30-34      -0,98(0,27)***    
35-39      -1,92(0,34)***    
Over40     -3,13(0,40)***    
Number of children 
 1 child(reference group)    0             
 2 children     -2,01(0,21)***    
3 or more children    -1,94(0,42)***    
Age of the youngest child 
0-1       0,05(0,27)             
2-4(reference group)     0     
5-7      0,27(0,23)    
8-10      0,45(0,26)*    
Over11     -0,29(0,29)    
Family Income  
  Less than 5000(reference group)   0    
  5000-10000     0,18(0,19)     
More than 10000    0,43(0,20)** 
Missing value     0,59(0,32)*    
High school diploma     
No      0 
Yes      0,08(0,21)    
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Table 7.  Continued 
 
Estimate (Standard error) 
 
Employment      
Employed(reference group)   0    
“On leave”     0,27(0,29)    
Non-employed    -0,08(0,19)    
Car  
No      0 
Yes      0,16(0,16)     
Dacha       
No      0 
Yes      0,17(0,20)    
Another apartment     
No      0 
Yes      0,38(0,29)    
***P<0,01,  **p<0,05,   *p<0,1  
 
 
The positive effect of family income suggests that having a spouse with high income 
increases the probability of wanting another child, which is indeed a noteworthy result. 
As explained earlier, it is not obvious what one should expect, since rich people would 
also tend to spend more on each child (have higher childbearing costs), and positive 
effects have rarely been seen in other studies.  Perhaps my result reflects that the low-
income group includes many people who are newly poor, i.e. who have incomes much 
below what they earned earlier, and which have formed their material aspirations. In this 
group, there may also be particularly much uncertainty about future earnings and strong 
fears about later periods with (temporarily) even lower incomes. Conversely, the richest 
group may include several who have recently become rich.  
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For working women, the family income also includes women‟s earnings. (Note 
that there may be variations in women‟s income even at a given level of education, which 
is included in the model). Higher earnings for women may depress subsequent fertility 
through higher expected opportunity costs under the assumption that a mother stays home 
some time to care for a child without full wage compensation (as in Russia). On the other 
hand, a woman with a high earning potential also contributes much to the family income 
once she returns to work, and given the positive income effect we have seen (very weakly 
supported by the positive effects of property ownership), this may increase fertility. Since 
there is at least more doubt about a positive effect of women‟s earnings than of men‟s 
earnings, one would expect to see a sharper positive effect of family income for the non-
employed than for the employed. This is also weakly indicated when models are 
estimated separately for the two groups (table 8).  
 
Table 8 Effects on various socio-demographic variables on the log-odds of wanting 
another child, by employment status. Married or cohabiting women. 
 
         Estimate (standard errors) 
      Model1        Model2 
        (Employed)     (Unemployed) 
Age of woman  
<20      -14,12(866)  -0,76(0,70)             
 20-24 (reference group)    0     
25-29      -0,17(0,35)  -0,39(0,14)*** 
30-34      -0,76(0,38)**   -1,40(0,52)*** 
35-39      -1,89(0,45)*** -1,66(0,66)**  
Over40     -3,26(0,51)*** -2,54(0,83)***
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Table 8. Continued 
 
          Estimate (standard errors) 
      Model1        Model2 
        (Employed)     (Unemployed) 
 
Number of children 
 1 child(reference group)    0      0       
   
 2 children     -1,86(0,27)*** -2,09(0,39)*** 
3 or more children    -2,33(0,76)*** -1,90(0,61)***
  
Age of the youngest child 
0-1       0,21(0,56)        -0,21(0,42)   
2-4 (reference group)     0   0
  
5-7      0,39(0,29)  -0,00(0,43)  
8-10      0,43(0,31)  0,38(0,56)  
Over11     -0,17(0,34)  -0,90(0,65)  
 
Family Income  
  Less than 5000(reference group)  0    0 
  5000-10000     0,05(0,25  0,27(0,39)  
More than 10000    0,23(0,25)  0,47(0,40) 
Missing value     0,78(0,44)*  0,47(0,40) 
 
High school diploma     
No      0   0 
Yes      0,09(0,20)  0,08(0,40)  
Car       
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No      0   0 
Yes      0,09(0,19)  0,25(0,32)  
 
Table 8. Continued 
            
                                                   Estimate (standard errors) 
      Model1        Model2 
        (Employed)     (Unemployed) 
Dacha       
No      0   0 
Yes      0,24(0,25)  0,28(0,44)  
Another apartment 
No      0   0 
Yes      0,64(0,36)  -0,48(0,58) 
             
 
***P<0,01,  **p<0,05,   *p<0,1  
 
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to conclude from the estimates whether women‟s 
earnings actually have a less positive effect than the spouse‟s earnings and perhaps even a 
negative one. In addition to the small difference between the two sets of estimates in table 
8, the interpretation of the education effect is difficult. The lack of a significant effect may 
indeed signal that a high earning potential for women at least does not reduce fertility 
strongly, but it is also possible that there actually is such an effect but counteracted by other 
factors (although not the higher incomes of the spouses of better-educated women, which is 
controlled for in the model). In principle, it is always possible that the better-educated have 
stronger childbearing preferences, given childbearing costs and incomes, thought there is 
no literature supporting this. More importantly, however, there is a selection problem.  
To see the selection problem, let us focus on the probability that a one-child mother 
wants another birth. In my model, I include the age of the mother and age of the youngest 
child. In other words, I compare the fertility desires among better-educated at, say, age 24 
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who had their first child, say, 2 years earlier and lower-educated at age 24 who had their 
first child 2 years earlier. The former are a very select group, since the better-educated tend 
to have their first child much later. They may be very „fertility prone‟. Similarly, when we 
compare at a high age, the lower educated may be relatively uninterested in children 
compared to what is usual. Kravdal (2001b) has shown that, when models are estimated 
simultaneously for first and higher-order births, with a common unobserved factor, 
education effects tend to be much less positive. Put differently, education effects are biased 
upwards in separate analyses of second, third and higher-order births. It is possible that, if I 
had used a more advanced method, the education effect might have been more negative and 
supported the idea of a negative effect of women‟s earnings through opportunity costs (or 
possibly other factors).  
The lack of effect of employment is in line with findings from other studies (Hoem 
and Hoem 1989; Kravdal 1992) and supports the idea that this factor may pick up 
counteracting effects of work orientation (the non-employed do not take opportunity costs 
into account, which contributes to high fertility) and work opportunity (the non-employed 
would indeed have liked to work, but cannot find adequate child care, which contributes to 
low fertility).  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Childbearing is costly in Russia, as in other developed countries. There are direct costs of 
for example clothes and food, as well as opportunity costs. The latter can in principle be 
low if there is a generous maternity leave system, and if it is easy to combine gainful work 
and childrearing after the maternity leave period, for example as a result of good access to 
high-quality day care (the cost of which are part of the direct costs).  The Russian 
government has recently taken steps to reduce these costs of childbearing markedly, 
especially through a more generous maternity leave system and the „maternal capital‟. This 
makes good sense if one is concerned about the consequences of low fertility (or more 
precisely, if the benefits of higher fertility are thought to be large compared to what one 
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might have achieved if the resources put into the pronatalist policy instead had been used 
for other purposes). The childbearing costs are reduced more for some groups than for 
others, which has implications for the intra-national fertility differentials, but that is not 
necessarily a problem.  
 There has been much uncertainty among demographers about the importance of 
men‟s income, since those with higher purchasing power also typically will have higher 
childbearing costs. High earnings for women are even less likely to increase fertility. 
Indeed, it has traditionally been thought to depress fertility. However, a positive effect of 
family income has been estimated in the present study, which suggests that there is a 
fertility stimulating effect of men‟s incomes, and perhaps one that is not fully counteracted 
by a correspondingly depressing effect of women‟s earnings. The lack of negative 
education effect may also indicate that women‟s wages are not strongly and negatively 
related to fertility (which perhaps was the case especially some years ago in the western 
countries where the economic-demographic theories originated), though there is a 
possibility of an upward selection bias in the estimate. Thus, if the positive economic 
development in Russia continues, so that incomes of (potential) parents increase, fertility 
may go up anyway, regardless of attempts to subsidize childbearing.  One should not 
necessarily expect fertility to keep increasing indefinitely in step with a long-term 
economic growth, eventually reaching perhaps far beyond the replacement level. More 
plausibly, we may see an increase for some years if fewer experience the uncertainty about 
the future and the feeling of deprivation compared to earlier years that may currently be 
especially common in the poorest segments of the population. 
 Finally, it should be noted that fertility may increase also without policies attempting 
to subsidizing childbearing costs or increases in incomes. Social norms or individual 
preferences may change, and politicians might even try to stimulate such a change through 
campaigns in which the individual pleasures of childrearing are pointed out and perhaps 
also the broader societal value is mentioned (as done in for example Singapore). That also 
has its price, however, and one cannot know whether the result will be particularly good 
compared to the amount spent.   
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